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PUBLIC PROTECTORS-
A DIFFERENT KIND OF BYSTANDER?-
COURT V. GRZELINSKI
Since Justice Traynor's seminal opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,' courts have struggled with the doctrine of strict liability. 2
One of the more difficult problems faced by the courts in this area is the
claim of an injured bystander 3 against a manufacturer of a defectively
dangerous product.
To resolve the bystander question, courts have focused on: (1) the rela-
tionship between the manufacturer and the bystander; 4 (2) the duty owed
the bystander by the manufacturer; 5 and (3) the foreseeability of injury to
1. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (recovery was allowed under a
strict liability claim to the injured user against the manufacturer of a defective lathe).
2. See Comment, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law
Determinism, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (1971); Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 916 (1964).
The strict product liability doctrine is stated in Greenman as follows:
[R]ules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs
of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's
liability to those injured by its defective products ... [Tihe liability is not one
governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1963).
In 1965 the American Law Institute included a provision concerning strict tort liability in the
Second Restatement of Torts. Section 402A states: "[Olne who sells any product in a detective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his prop-
erty. ... Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
3. A bystander has been described as a reasonably foreseeable non-user or consumer.
White v. Jeffrey Galion Co., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 751, 754 (E.D. I11. 1971). See also Winnett v.
Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 11, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1974); and notes 4, 5, and accompanying text infra.
4. Eliminating the privity requirement between the plaintiff and defendant in a products
liability action was essential to protect the bystander. The erosion of the privity requirement
started with food product cases and expanded to all types of products. See Jaeger, Privity of
Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1963). See also Mieher v. Brown, 54
I11. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973); Genaust v. I11. Power Co., 23 I11. App. 3d 1023, 320 N.E.2d
412 (1974), aff'd, 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
5. It has been said that duty extends to a bystander by his mere status as a human being.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 700 (1962). See also Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14
(1963).
A minority of courts hold that recovery under strict liability is limited to users and consum-
ers. See, e.g., Davidson v. Leadingham, 294 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ky. 1968) (diversity action
arising out of automobile accident).
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the bystander. 6 When the injured party is a public employee engaged in an
inherently dangerous occupation, such as that of policeman or fireman, the
court also considers the affirmative defense of assumption of risk.
7
It is well established in Illinois that a policeman or fireman may recover
from an owner or occupier of land who fails to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition. 8 However, the "fireman's rule", which restricts a
fireman's right of recovery, states that an injured fireman may not recover
solely on the basis of the landowner's negligence in causing the fire.9 In the
recent case of Court v. Grzelinski,10 the Illinois Supreme Court was asked
to apply the fireman's rule to deny recovery to a fireman under a strict
liability claim. The court denied such an extension of the rule and allowed
the fireman to bring a strict liability action against a manufacturer and an
automobile dealership.
This Note will trace the history of the fireman's rule in Illinois and re-
view the Grzelinski analysis. It will question the court's reasoning in light of
its failure to consider persuasive policy arguments underlying bystander re-
covery and significant recent precedent. Furthermore, the Note will
evaluate the impact of Grzelinski in light of current Illinois trends.11
6. Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652,
657 (1969) (action against automobile manufacturer for personal injuries allegedly caused by
defect); Genaust v. Ill. Power Co., 23 III. App. 3d 1023, 320 N.E.2d 412 (1974), aff'd, 62 Ill. 2d
456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976) (action against power company for injuries sustained by plaintiff
when an electrical current arced from uninsulated power lines of defendant).
7. Under this affirmative defense, the plaintiff is barred from recovery if it can be shown
that the user or consumer knew of the defect and nonetheless proceeded to make use of the
product. Sweeney v. Max A.R. Matthews & Co., 46 I11. 2d 64, 264 N.E.2d 170 (1970) (action by
carpenter against retailer for sale of nail which shattered when struck, injuring plaintiff's eye).
Assumption of risk may also act as a bar to recovery under a negligence theory. Fancil v.
Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 I11. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975) (wrongful death action against store
owner who failed to provide an outside light on premises; a policeman was killed during routine
evening security check). See also Note, Landlord's Duty to the Police-Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods,
Inc., 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 378 (1977); notes 10, 71, and accompanying text infra.
8. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 416-17, 170- N.E.2d 881, 886 (1960) (plaintiffs, city
firemen, were buried in burning debris while fighting a fire when a defectively attached stair-
way collapsed). But see Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 III. 2d 103, 361 N.E.2d 282
(1976); Young v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 46 I11. App. 3d 167, 360 N.E.2d 978 (3d Dist. 1977);
Erickson v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 21 I1. App. 3d 546, 315 N.E.2d 912 (1st Dist. 1974). These
decisions limit the Dini holding to injuries resulting from causes independent of the fire. For a
discussion of the Arco case see Note, Landowners' Liability To Injured Firefighters In Illinois-
Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 137 (1977).
9. Erickson v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 21111. App. 3d 546, 315 N.E.2d 912 (1st Dist. 1974).
10. 72 Ill. 2d 141, 379 N.E.2d 281 (1978).
11. The growing trend in the United States is to abolish absolute bars to recovery, particu-
larly where the plaintiff has acted reasonably. This is evidenced in the abolishment or limitation
of the assumption of risk doctrine in negligence cases. Assumption of risk as a total bar to
recovery has been abolished in the following jurisdictions: Alaska, Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d
61, 68 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1968); California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d
1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975); Kentucky, Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 26, 1978, plaintiff, a Chicago fireman, responded to a call of an
automobile fire. While he was attaching the fire hose to a hydrant approxi-
mately 35 feet away from the burning vehicle, the gasoline tank exploded,
resulting in severe bums to plaintiff. A product liability action was filed by
the fireman against Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., the seller, 12 and General
Motors, the manufacturer of the automobile.1 3 The trial court dismissed the
product liability counts, applying a strict application of the fireman's rule, 14
and the appellate court reversed. 15 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the appellate court's decision, rejecting the argument of General Motors that
firemen comprise a special class to which no duty is owed because of the
inherent danger of their occupation.' 6
(Ky. App. Ct. 1967); New Jersey, McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 274-76, 196
A.2d 238, 239-41 (1963); New Mexico, Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 341, 491 P.2d 1147,
1152 (1971); Texas, Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1975);
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Cum. Supp. 1978)), abolishing the
affirmative defense of assumption of risk in contributory negligence cases; Oregon (OR. REv.
STAT. ch. 18, § 18.475(2)(1977)), abolishing implied assumption of risk.
Illinois courts have followed this trend by confining the affirmative defense of assumption of
risk to cases that involve an express consent or contractual or employment relationship. Barrett
v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 248 N.E.2d 111 (1969). See also ILL. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTnONS
§§ 13.01, 13.02 (1961), which require a contractual or employment relationship in order for
defendant to raise the affirmative defense of assumption of risk. It should be noted that the
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions were amended in 1977 to include § 400.03, a strict liability
section, that does not require any special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. The
comment to the instructions states that the policy considerations of the strict liability doctrine
require proof of a greater degree of culpability on the plaintiff's part than mere contributory
negligence for the defendant to prevail. Cf Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 57 I11. 2d 94, 311
N.E.2d 128 (1974) (assumption of risk by a person using the product will not operate as a
defense in an action for injuries to a bystander who did not assume the risk).
At least one jurisdiction has refused to adopt the fireman's rule, stating: "At the outset we
are confronted with [defendant's] argument that the 'fireman's rule' should preclude recovery.
Although many jurisdictions forbid recoveries by firemen for injuries suffered at the scene of the
negligently caused conflagration Texas has no such rule." Harris v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe R.R., 538 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 1976).
12. Plaintiff claimed that Nickey, the used car dealer from whom defendant purchased the
car, assembled, installed, and positioned the gas tank in a defective manner. 72 I11. 2d at 145-46,
379 N.E.2d at 282-83.
13. Plaintiff claimed that GM placed into the stream of commerce a gas tank which was
defective and that plaintiff's injury, which was caused by the defective product, was reasonably
forseeable. 72 I11. 2d at 146, 379 N.E.2d at 282.
14. Relying on Erickson v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 21 Ill. App. 3d 546, 315 N.E.2d 912 (1st
Dist. 1974) which strictly applied the fireman's rule, the Grzelinski trial court held that the
plaintiff should be barred from recovery since his injuries were sustained in the course of his
employment from a cause not independent of the fire. 48 Ill. App. 3d 716, 719-20, 363 N.E.2d
12, 14 (1st Dist. 1977).
15. Id.
16. 72 I11. 2d at 146-49, 379 N.E.2d at 283-84. General Motors' argument was predicated on
a classification of firemen as invitees. This classification is rooted in common law, instituted at a
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HISTORY OF THE FIREMAN'S RULE
As early as 189217 the Illinois Supreme Court viewed firemen as licensees
to whom no duty of ordinary care was owed.' A licensee has often been
described as one who comes upon the land with the landowner's consent,
but for his own purposes.' 9 Recovery was available only if the fireman
could show that the cause of his injury was willful and wanton conduct on
the part of the owner or occupier of the land.2 0 In 1942 the court recog-
nized the harshness of this rule and upgraded the classification of firemen to
that of invitees. 2' An invitee has been described as one who is invited upon
the land for the landowner's purposes and to whom the landowner owes a
duty of reasonable care to make the premises safe.2 2
Not until 1960 was the Illinois Supreme Court again asked to review the
question of the legal duty owed to a fireman to protect him from injuries
incurred during performance of his job.2 3 At that time, in Dini v.
time when the status of the person entering upon property determined the duties of the land-
owners or occupiers of the land. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HAnv. L. REv. 725 (1937).
Such classifications have been considered by Illinois courts in evaluating the propriety of suits
against landowners brought by injured firemen or policemen.
17. In Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892), a fireman was injured when a
rope broke and caused an elevator counterweight to fall on his leg. The court determined that
the plaintiff was a licensee to whom no duty of care was required. Id. at 190, 32 N.E. at 186.
Later the court similarly denied recovery to a policeman who fell through an unguarded
elevator shaft while on the job. Casey v. Adams, 234 I11. 350, 84 N.E.2d 933 (1908).
18. Gibson v. Leonard, 143 I11. 182, 190, 32 N.E. 182, 186 (1892).
19. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 376 (4th ed. 1971); Bohlen,
The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA.
L. REV. 340, 344 (1921); Comment, Are Firemen and Policemen Licensees or Invitees?, 35
MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1937).
20. Gibson v. Leonard, 143 I11. 182, 189, 32 N.E. 182, 183 (1892). See also note 17 supra.
21. Ryan v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 315 I11. App. 65, 42 N.E.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1942).
This case changed the status of a public protector (fireman and policeman) from that of licensee
and gave them a unique status. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960),
which states "since firemen have a unique status, it follows that the duties owed to them may
properly be unique; and that same approach was followed by our Illinois Appellate Court in
Ryan v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. ... Id. at 415, 170 N.E.2d at 885.
The Ryan decision further elevated the legal duty of a landowner/occupier of land from a duty
to refrain from willful and wanton conduct to a duty of reasonable care to make the premises
safe. 315 I11. App. 65, 76, 42 N.E.2d 128, 133 (1st Dist. 1942). See e.g., W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 385-86, 395-98 (4th ed. 1971).
22. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 385-86 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser also
discusses how courts have distinguished between those classified as invitees and licensees on
two theoretical grounds: the economic benefit theory and the representation of reasonable care
theory. Id. at 386-88.
23. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). For a complete discussion of
landowner/occupier duty see Appel, Premises Liability, 67 ILL. BAR J. 96 (October, 1978). Al-
though various jurisdictions have made significant, changes in the common law approach to
premises liability, such as the elimination of the distinction between licensees and invitees,
Illinois has continued to adhere to these principles and retains the common law distinctions of
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Naiditch,2 4 the court held that an injured fireman could recover when
defendant's negligence caused the fire which resulted in the injury, as well
as for injuries resulting from unknown or hidden conditions which increased
fire-fighting risks. 25  In Washington v. Arco, 26 the court narrowed the Dini
holding and limited a fireman's recovery to include only those injuries
caused by unsafe conditions independent of those which caused the fire. 27
In Grzelinski, the court expanded that protection and allowed a fireman to
bring an action against a manufacturer and others when the fireman's in-
juries resulted from a defective product.28
THE GRZELINSKI RATIONALE
The Grzelinski court, applying a bystander theory, 29 enabled the fireman
to bring a product liability action. In so doing, it rejected the defendant-
manufacturer's argument that the fireman's rule should apply in all cir-
cumstances where a fireman was injured in the performance of his duties.3 6
The court reasoned that the Illinois fireman's rule is a compromise between
two conflicting policies 31 enabling a fireman to recover for non-fire related
injuries caused by a landowner's negligence. 32  The landowner, however,
owes no duty to a fireman to exercise due care to prevent fires from occur-
ring on his premises. 33
trespassers, invitees, and licensees in spite of judicial dissatisfaction. See Washington v. Arco, 66
I11. 2d 103, 361 N.E.2d 282 (1976) (Dooley, J., dissenting), where Justice Dooley states, in
reference to the common law distinctions of invitee and licensee, that "the time to abolish all
labels is now." Id. at 115, 361 N.E.2d at 288.
24. 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
25. Id. at 416-17, 170 N.E.2d at 886. See also note 26 infra. Prosser notes that Dini "was
somewhat weakened as authority by the fact that the violation of statutes was given as an alter-
native ground.'" W. PR OSSERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 398 n.93 (4th ed. 1971).
26. 66 I11. 2d 103, 361 N.E.2d 282 (1976). Two Chicago firemen were injured in a fire
caused by a defective shutoff valve on a gasoline pump at defendant's gas station. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that Dini did not apply to situations where the fire-fighter's injury was a
result of the landowner's negligence in causing the fire.
27. Id. at 108, 361 N.E.2d at 285.
28. 72 Ill. 2d at 151, 379 N.E.2d at 285.
29. See note 3 supra.
30. 72 I11. 2d at 148-49, 379 N.E.2d at 284.
31. See note 32 infra.
32. Recognizing that the risk of harm from fire is inherent in a fireman's occupation, the
Illinois courts have defined a compromise rule. The Illinois version of the rule is stated as: a
landowner or occupier of land owes a duty to firemen to exercise reasonable care to prevent
unsafe conditions on the premises which may cause injury but has no duty to prevent injury
resulting from the fire itself. See Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 I11. 2d 103, 108, 361
N.E.2d 282, 285 (1976). See also Young v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R, Co., 46 Ill. App.3d 167, 169,
360 N.E.2d 978, 980 (3d Dist. 1977); Erickson v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R. Co., 21 I11. App. 3d
546, 548, 315 N.E.2d 912, 914 (1st Dist. 1974).
33. See note 32 supra.
1979]
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The court's criticism of defendant's attempt to expand the fireman's rule
beyond the narrow context of landowner-occupier liability m stems from Il-
linois' limited use of the affirmative defense of assumption of risk in both
negligence and strict liability actions.3 5  The court acknowledged that ex-
tending the fireman's rule beyond the landowner-occupier context would be
"tantamount to imposing the doctrine of assumption of risk" on fire-
fighters.3 6  Such an imposition, the court concluded, would be contrary to
Illinois law which recognizes that doctrine as an affirmative defense but not
as a theory upon which to base a complete bar to recovery.3 7
In support of its position that firemen should be barred from recovery for
injuries resulting from risks inherently involved in fire-fighting,3 8 the
defendant-manufacturer cited two California Appellate Court decisions.3 9
The Grzelinski court noted that the California courts refused to base their
holdings upon the assumption of risk doctrine. Instead the California courts
relied upon two policy considerations, risk spreading and efficient judicial
administration. Since it is well settled in Illinois that a fireman may recover
from a landowner or occupier of land for injuries caused by factors indepen-
dent of the fire, 40 the Grzelinski court concluded that risk spreading 41
was not an appropriate reason for denial of recovery; therefore, the two
California cases were not controlling. The Grzelinski court also concluded
that the judicial efficiency argument was unpersuasive in light of Illinois'
statutory requirement that all fires resulting in property damage be investi-
gated. 42 The Illinois courts presumably would have the benefit of these
investigations in determining the cause of a fire. The statutory requirement,
34. 72 I1. 2d at 148-51, 379 N.E.2d at 284-85.
35. In Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960), the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated: "[ifn terms of duty, it may be said there is none owed the fireman to exercise care so as
not to require the special services for which he is trained and paid." Id. at 274, 157 A.2d at
131. See also Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
932 (1974), which supports the proposition that assumption of risk is available in strict liability
actions.
36. 72 I11. 2d 141, 148-49, 379 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1978).
37. Id. at 149, 379 N.E.2d at 284.
38. Id.
39. Scott v. E.L. Yaeger Constr. Co., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1190, 91 Cal. Rptr. 232 (4th Dist.
1970); Giorgi v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1st Dist. 1968).
In Giorgi a fireman brought suit against defendant for negligent maintenance of a pole and
wires which caused a forest fire. The fire trapped federal employees who were trained to fight
forest fires as part of their duties. The California Court of Appeals found for defendant and
determined that "a paid fireman has no cause of action against one whose passive negligence
caused the fire in which he was injured." 266 Cal. App. 2d at 360, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
40. See note 32 supra.
41. "Risk spreading is based upon the rationale that the cost of injuries to fire fighters
should be distributed among the community at large rather than be imposed upon the party
responsible for the injuries." 72 Ill. 2d 141, 150, 379 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1978).
42. 72 Ill. 2d at 150, 379 N.E.2d at 285. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127-1/2, § 6 (1977).
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coupled with the principle of judicial responsibility demanding that courts
not avoid "inconvenient" cases, caused the court to decline to follow the
California holdings. 43
Having rejected the California analysis, the Grzelinski court made a de-
termination that the Illinois fireman's rule, limiting a landowner's duty to
maintain safe premises, had no application in strict product liability actions.
Referring to Justice Traynor's argument supporting strict liability," the court
held that public policy demands that a fireman be protected from the type of
injury sustained by the plaintiff.45 Justice Traynor's argument was based on
43. 72 I11. 2d at 149-51, 379 N.E.2d at 284-85.
44. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring), it is stated that: "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market." Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440.
45. 72 I11. 2d at 150-51, 379 N.E.2d at 285. Justice Ryan, disagreeing with the majority's
analysis, predicated his dissent upon various flaws in that reasoning. Relying upon Washington
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 I11. 2d 103, 361 N.E.2d 282 (1976), Justice Ryan claimed that the
present Illinois fireman's rule is not solely related to the duty of the landowner or occupier of
land as determined by the status of the persons upon the premises. By restricting the fireman's
rule to the limited context of landowner/occupier liability, the majority neglected to focus on
the threshold issue of assumption of risk. Further, citing authority from other jurisdictions,
Justice Ryan added that the assumption of risk doctrine defines the degree of duty owed a
fireman and should not be considered an affirmative defense to a negligence or products liability
case. He noted that the fireman should be barred from recovery under a products liability claim
because his training prepared him for the very hazard which resulted in his injury. Therefore,
no duty should flow to the fireman in situations where the danger should have been anticipated.
id. at 151-55, 379 N.E.2d at 285-89.
Justice Ryan also criticized the opinion as over-extending the bounds of the strict product
liability doctrine in Illinois. The majority relied upon Winnett v. Winnett, 57 I11. 2d 7, 310
N.E.2d 1 (1974), ignoring the court's responsibility to determine the duty question and
willingly allocating such responsibility to the factfinder. Id. at 157, 379 N.E.2d at 288. Further,
Justice Ryan claimed that the majority attempted to equate the foreseeability concept with that
of duty contrary to precedent stating that the two concepts are not coextensive. 72 III. 2d at
157, 379 N.E.2d at 288.
Justice Ryan also believed that an anomaly existed in the majority opinion. As an example, he
noted that in the case of an injury sustained by a fireman fighting a fire in an automobile parked
in a driveway, recovery would be barred. However, if the same injury occurred due to an
automobile fire on a public street, there would be liability. Such an anomaly results from the
majority's insistence upon retaining the fireman's rule in its limited landowner/occupier context.
He also perceived constitutional problems. These questions involve the rationale for creating
classifications which grant protection to one segment of society while denying that same protec-
tion to another segment of society on arbitrary grounds. Id. at 152-53, 379 N.E.2d at 286. See
Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 II1. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964) (action for damages for
injuries caused by defendant's negligence in maintenance of playground facilities); Grasse v.
Dealer's Transport Co., 412 I11. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952) (action for damages sustained by
plaintiff during the course of his employment. Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision
resulting from the negligence of one of defendant's employees).
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the rationale that responsibility be placed where it will most effectively re-
duce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products.4 6  The
Grzelinski court, in applying Justice Traynor's reasoning, concluded that
firemen should not be expected to assume the undue risks presented by a
defective product which may result in injuries. 47
CRITIQUE
The threshold issue in Grzelinski involved a legal duty4  which is often
determined by the relationship between the parties.4 9  The question of duty
owed a "bystander" is presented whenever injuries are caused by a defective
product and the injured party is not a user of the product at the time the
injury occurs. 50  A further difficulty arises in cases, such as Grzelinski, in
which the bystander is a public employee performing his duties. Whether a
public employee should be viewed differently from any other bystander be-
cause of the dangerous nature of his occupation is a question which must be
determined before any court can allow a fireman-bystander to recover under
a strict liability theory.
Public Policy
In rejecting defendant's proposed classification, 5 1 the Illinois Supreme
Court looked to the policy considerations underlying the fireman's rule. 52 A
more appropriate starting point, however, would have been the policy
reasons underlying strict product liability. 53 Illinois courts have agreed that
public policy is of primary importance in imposing strict liability. 54  The
46. See note 44 supra.
47. 72 I11. 2d at 151, 379 N.E.2d at 285.
48. 72 II1. 2d at 146, 379 N.E.2d at 283. See also Defendant's Petition for Leave to Appeal
at 8-13 (General Motors Corp.); Plaintiff's Reply Brief at 2-4.
49. Barnes v. Washington, 56 II1. 2d 22, 26, 305 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1973) (action by conser-
vator for injuries to incompetent who accidentally locked himself in a boxcar of defendant rail-
road and sustained injuries from the cold); Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 56 Ill. 2d 95,
97, 306 N.E.2d 39, 40 (1973) (wrongful death action against currency exchange and a teller for
negligence in teller refusing to comply with an armed robber's demands which resulted in
plaintiff's husband's death). See also Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 552, 554-55, 328
N.E.2d 538, 540 (1975).
50. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
51. 72 111. 2d at 147-48, 379 N.E.2d at 283-84. See also note 16 and accompanying text
supra.
52. Id. The policy reasons behind the fireman's rule were primarily to prevent the place-
ment of an undue burden upon an owner or occupier of improved land on the assumption that
most fires occur because of the landowner's or occupier's negligence. See also Washington v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 I11. 2d 103, 108, 361 N.E.2d 282, 284 (1976).
53. See Sipara v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 63 II1. App. 3d 985, 990, 380 N.E.2d 819, 823
(4th Dist. 1978). See also note 2 supra.
54. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 111. App. 2d 318, 325-27, 201 N.E.2d 313, 317-18 (1st
Dist. 1964), affd, 32 Ill. 2d 608, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1964). See also White v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 751, 753 (E.D. I11. 1971).
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major policy reasons which support recovery under a strict liability claim are
loss spreading 55 and economic efficiency. 56
The doctrine of loss spreading shifts losses caused by defective products to
the parties in the best position to lessen the economic impact of the loss,
i.e., manufacturers and distributors of the product.5 7 The fact that the
Grzelinski court placed the risk of loss on the manufacturer and the au-
tomobile dealership without discussing the principle of loss spreading is a
serious defect in the analysis. Such a discussion would have strengthened
the court's position by responding to some of the many recent criticisms of
the loss spreading principle. First, in certain cases the manufacturer may not
be in the best position to absorb the loss. 58 Second, it may be unfair to
require all consumers to pay the increased price of "insured" 5 9 products
when some consumers may choose to accept the risk of uninsured prod-
ucts.6 0 Third, it has been suggested that another legal theory may provide
ample loss spreading without imposing strict liability.6 1
The Grzelinski court, by finding for plaintiff, has actually implemented a
loss spreading policy. Therefore, a point by point discussion of the criticisms
along with reasons why they were not persuasive in this case would have
been worthwhile. 6 2  Refusal to do so places the adequacy of the court's
analysis in question.
55. See K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 204, 340-41 (1930)
where the loss spreading doctrine was suggested. The doctrine was subsequently adopted in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1963).
56. This policy was developed for the purpose of deterring the manufacturer from marketing
defective products. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944), for a summarization of this principle. The more sophisticated policy con-
siderations of economic efficiency has recently been specifically applied to products liability.
Symposium -Products Liability: Economic Analysis and the Law, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1970).
57. This is premised on the belief that the manufacturer can either absorb the loss or insure
against it, thus spreading the added cost among the purchasers. The doctrine is predicated on
the fact that the purchaser pays for the cost of insurance covering losses resulting from defective
products as well as the product itself. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
58. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS-A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 50-51
(1970).
59. An "insured" product is one in which the manufacturer has incorporated the cost of
protecting himself against potential economic loss due to injuries sustained by users. See W.
BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO COM-
PENSATION PLANS 59 (1965).
60. Id.
61. An argument can be made that under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, a negligence action
may provide adequate loss spreading without resorting to strict liability. See Comment, Strict
Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
625, 637 (1971).
62. The Grzelinski court could have easily responded to criticisms of implementing a loss
spreading policy. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to dispute that General Motors is
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The second policy consideration, economic efficiency, adds another di-
mension to the rationale underlying the imposition of strict liability. Accord-
ing to this principle, losses caused by defective products are imposed upon
the party in the best position to prevent future injuries of the same type by
making a safer product or by assuring careful use of the product. 63 The
manufacturer's responsibility to produce a safe product is viewed in conjunc-
tion with the consumer's ability to prevent injuries by careful use of the
product.64 Courts therefore balance the cost of minimizing the accident
with the cost of avoiding the accident. 65 An economic efficiency analysis
would, appropriately, focus on the product itself and the adequacy of the
manufacturer's safeguards against injury.66 Had the court approached the
problem in this way, it could have effectively warned both the manufacturer
and consumer of their respective burdens.
When a product is defective, the innocent bystander as well as the con-
sumer should be protected. The bystander status should not change the manu-
facturer's duty to provide a safe product. Nor. should the bystander be asked
to accept a standard of care lower than that expected by the consumer. The
significance of public policy considerations is also not altered simply because
the plaintiff's occupation enhances the likelihood of injuries caused by the
better able to sustain economic loss than a private individual. However, manufacturers often
minimize such economic loss by incorporating the cost of such a loss in the price of the product.
A valid argument can be made that the consumer should be able to avoid this added cost by
personally assuming the risk of loss. Imposing such a choice upon a consumer mandates the
availability of complete and detailed information outlining the potential risk of loss. Since con-
sumers are provided with little or no information as to the potential for economic loss due to a
defective gas tank, the consumer is precluded from making a well-reasoned decision. In addi-
tion, an automobile is composed of various different products. Many problems would arise if the
consumer assumed the risk of loss concerning one product and the manufacturer assumed the
risk of loss in another.
63. This theory was applied in the context of a bystander's claim in Darryl v. Ford Motor
Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1969). Plaintiffs brought suit against Ford Motor Company
for injuries arising out of an automobile collision. Both negligence and strict liability claims were
pleaded. The negligence claim was ultimately abandoned and the strict liability claim was re-
tained. The court held that: "[tihe reason for extending the strict liability doctrine to innocent
bystanders is the desire to minimize risks of personal injury and/or property damage." Id. at
633.
64. See Wade, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 1329 (1966). See also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965). In Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1974), the court, using Professor Wade's
balancing factors, considered a seven-pronged analysis for determining manufacturer re-
sponsibility which placed some of the burden for avoiding injuries upon the consumer. Id. at
1039 n. 13.
65. This balancing might not be necessary if the manufacturer and consumer have exact,
complete data regarding risks and transaction costs. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.
LAw & ECON. 1 (1960).
66. See Comment, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law
Determinism, 38 U. CIi. L. REv. 625, 639-40 (1971).
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defective product. Accordingly, these policy reasons should have been fully
discussed and analyzed by the Grzelinski court.
A discussion of these public policy considerations would have also helped
to clarify the relationship between the bystander and the manufacturer
which, like the relationship between manufacturer and consumer, encom-
passes a legal duty.67 In strict product liability cases the manufacturer has a
non-delegable duty to produce a reasonably safe product.6 8  This duty is
closely guarded by the courts and can only be set aside by a clear showing
that the injury was unforeseeable, 69 the product was put to an unintended
use, 70 or the plaintiff knowingly assumed a risk inherent in the product. 71
The necessity of establishing this duty should not be negated or ignored in a
bystander situation. 72 Neither can this duty be circumvented by expecting
that others will remove the burden of the duty from the manufacturer.
73  It
67. See note 4 supra.
68. Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 59 III. 2d 79, 85, 319 N.E.2d 232, 235-36 (1974).
For a complete discussion of this case see Hofeld, Looking At a Decade of Products Liability
Law in Illinois-Where We've Been and Where We're Going, 64 ILL. BAR. J. 344, 349-50
(February, 1976).
69. "Foreseeability means that which is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what
might conceivably occur." Winnett v. Winnett, 57 I1. 2d 7, 12-13, 310 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1974).
70. Sweeney v. Max A.R. Matthews & Co., 46 I1. 2d 64, 264 N.E.2d 170 (1970). See also
Knapp v. Hertz, 59 II. App. 3d 241, 375 N.E.2d 1349 (1st Dist. 1918) (strict liability action
against rental car company for injuries sustained when brake system of rented car mal-
functioned).
71. The doctrine of assumption of risk may be used as a defense to a product liability action.
Coty v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., Inc., 58 Il. App. 3d 237, 373 N.E.2d 1371 (2d Dist. 1978). See
Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960). In Krauth, plaintiff fireman, injured while
fighting a fire, was denied recovery under the theory that the fireman was trained and paid for
the special services which he performed. This policy has been recognized by the Illinois Appel-
late Court in Horcher v. Guerin, 94 Ill. App. 2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (2d Dist. 1968) (plaintiff
fireman was injured when glass struck his eye after he broke a locked window to ventilate a
burning building owned by defendant. Plaintiff alleged negligence by defendant in failing to
obey a city ordinance prohibiting obstruction of windows); Netherton v. Arends, 81 111. App. 2d
391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (4th Dist. 1967) (plaintiff fireman was injured when he inhaled smoke
produced by the fire. Plaintiff alleged the fire resulted from several negligent acts or omissions
by defendant/landowner. The court held that plaintiff had no cause of action since smoke is a
hazard normally present during fires).
In Horcher, the court stated:
As to the fire itself, it is the firemen's business to deal with this particular hazard.
He is trained and paid for this .... The exposure to liability which would result
from such rule [landowner's duty to exercise care to prevent fires on his premises]
would impose an unreasonable burden upon a person who owned or occupied im-
proved land.
Horcher v. Guerin, 94 II1. App. 2d at 248, 236 N.E.2d at 579 (2d Dist. 1968).
72. Both plaintiff and defendant-manufacturer General Motors emphasized the duty re-
quirement in their briefs to the Illinois Supreme Court. See note 48 supra.
73. Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 59 I11. 2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974); Rivera v.
Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 I1. App. 3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1st Dist. 1971).
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is clear that the obligation is upon the court to determine whether such a
duty exists. 74 The inability or reluctance of the Grzelinski court to acknowl-
edge this important step and affirmatively declare why such a duty was
imposed makes it difficult to predict the outcome of future cases involving
different fact situations. Finally, although defendants only addressed the
question of an expansion of the fireman's rule, the court should have looked
beyond this narrow question to provide clear guidelines for subsequent cases.
Precedent Ignored
Approximately three years prior to Grzelinski, the Illinois Supreme Court
had no difficulty formulating clear rules for the imposition of duty in a negli-
gence claim brought by a public protector. In that case, Fancil v. Q.S.E.
Foods, Inc., 75 assumption of risk was also a primary question. Fancil in-
volved a police officer who was killed when a burglar emerged from the
darkened doorway behind defendant's place of business. The decedent's wife
brought a wrongful death action charging the store owner with negligence
for disconnecting an exterior light. The court looked beyond the common
law classifications of trespasser, 76 licensee, 77 and invitee 78 as not providing a
satisfactory basis for a determination of duty. 79  Instead, the court focused
its attention on the Restatement of Torts.80
74. The question of duty, the legal obligation imposed upon one for the benefit of another,
is one of law to be determined by the court. Barnes v. Wa'shington, 56 Il. 2d 22, 26, 305
N.E.2d 535, 538 (1973); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 206 (4th ed. 1971).
75. 60 Ill. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
76. Illinois subscribes to the broad proposition that an owner or occupier of land is under no
duty to keep the land in any specific manner to protect trespassers. Hessler v. Cole, 7 I11. App.
3d 902, 289 N.E.2d 204 (1st Dist. 1972).
77. A licensee is often described as someone who enters the premises with the landowner's
consent, but for his own purposes. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). See
also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 376 (4th ed. 1971), note 19, and accom-
panying text supra.
78. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
79. 60 II. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
80. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court, relying on §§ 302(b), 448, and 449 of the Restatement
of Torts (Second), claimed that the appellate court had failed to consider the relationship be-
tween the parties involved in determining the store owner's duty to the decedent. The Fancil
court quoted at length from the Restatement:
Section 302(b) provides:
"An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the
other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct
is criminal."
Section 448 provides:
"The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a
superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's neg-
ligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person
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The Fancil court was persuaded by two appellate court cases which denied
recovery for injuries caused by inherent risks. 8 ' These two cases in turn
relied heavily on Dini v. Naiditch, discussed at length by the Grzelinski
court, which held that the owner of a building was under no duty to a fire
fighter to use reasonable care in the maintenance of his premises. 82 The
Fancil court found that the landowner had no legal duty with respect to a
person injured on his premises due to some dangerous condition of the
property unless two conditions were present. First, the dangerous condition
must constitute an unreasonable risk of harm. Second, the injured party
must not have at his disposal reasonable means to protect himself from the
risks which caused the injury.8 3 Following a traditional assumption of risk
approach, the Fancil court concluded that police officers were barred from
recovery for injuries resulting from risks inherent in their occupation when
such risks of harm were reasonable in light of the officer's training and abil-
ity to protect himself.84
The similarities between Fancil and Grzelinski are striking and demand
recognition. Both injured parties were public employees engaged in inher-
ently dangerous occupations. Additionally, although Fancil was a wrongful
death action based on negligence and Grzelinski was brought under a strict
liability theory, plaintiffs in both cases argued that the relationship between
the parties created a legal duty which was breached. Also, defendants in
to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct
realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be
created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit
such a tort or crime."
Section 449 provides:
"If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard
or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether inno-
cent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from
being liable for harm caused thereby."
Id. at 558-59, 328 N.E.2d at 541-42.
81. Horcher v. Guerin, 94 II1. App. 2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (2d Dist. 1968); Netherton v.
Arends, 81 I11. App. 2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (4th Dist. 1967).
82. 20 111. 2d 406, 170 N.E. 2d 881 (1960). See note 8supra for a list of cases which limited
the Dini holding.
83. 60 I11. 2d 552, 558-60, 328 N.E.2d 538, 541-43 (1975).
84. 60 I11. 2d 552, 558, 328 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1975). The inherent risk doctrine is based
upon two policy reasons. First, if liability was imposed upon a landowner for a negligently
caused fire, landowners might be discouraged from summoning the aid of firemen for fear of a
lawsuit should a fireman sustain injury while fighting the fire. Second, courts have determined
that police officers and firemen assume the risks incidental to their respective professions. See,
e.g., Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 273-74, 157 A.2d 129, 130-31 (1960). See also Horcher v.
Guerin, 94 Ill. App. 2d 244, 248, 236 N.E.2d 576, 579 (2d Dist. 1968)i Buren v. Midwest
Industries, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Ky. App. 1964).
For a discussion of the inherent risk doctrine as it relates to the Fancil decision see Note,
Landlord's Duty to the Police-Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 378, 380-84
(1977).
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both cases argued that because certain risks were inherent in the plaintiff's
occupation, recovery should be barred.
The Fancil court, in resolving the duty issue, outlined two requirements
necessary for assumption of risk to act as a bar to recovery in a negligence
action. It concluded that the plaintiff must be aware of the risks involved
and that he must voluntarily expose himself to a specific known risk.8 5 In
applying this test, the court concluded that a policeman on a routine nightly
security check of a store is trained and prepared to confront and handle the
dangers involved in criminal activity. Awareness of the potential risk,
coupled with the policeman's ability to cope with it, barred plaintiff's claim
under the assumption of risk doctrine.
The Grzelinski court could have used a similar test to enable plaintiff to
recover for the severe burn injuries he sustained when the gas tank exploded.
It is obvious that a fireman is trained and prepared to fight fires. However,
that training does not include, nor should it be expected to include, readi-
ness for every danger which might be encountered. The plaintiff alleged that
the proximate cause of the explosion which injured him was a defect in the
automobile's gas tank.86 While the public has a right to expect firemen to
assume certain risks inherent in fire fighting, 87 the fire fighter has a right to
expect that an unreasonably dangerous product will not be placed into the
stream of commerce.88 Since plaintiff could not have been aware of the
specific defect which allegedly caused the explosion, he should not be ex-
pected to protect himself against it. 8 9
It has been noted in another jurisdiction that the affirmative defense of
assumption of risk, as suggested by defendant in the Grzelinski case, is only
available when:
(1) plaintiff actually knew of the specific defect involved;
(2) that actually knowing and appreciating the specific defect involved,
that plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably took his chances and ex-
posed himself to that defect and the resulting danger;
(3) that this specific known and appreciated defect was the cause of plain-
tiff's injuries. 90
The same reasoning should apply where, as in Grzelinski, the plaintiff's in-
jury is proximately caused by a hidden defect of which he could not have
been aware. Similarly, it is unreasonable to expect that a fireman's training
85. 60 I11. 2d 552, 557, 328 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1975).
86. 72 I11. 2d at 145-46, 379 N.E.2d at 282-83 (1978).
87. Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 Ill. 2d 103, 105-08, 361 N.E.2d 282, 284
(1976); Horcher v. Guerin, 94 I11. App. 2d 244, 247-48, 248 N.E.2d 576, 578-79 (2d Dist. 1968);
Netherton v. Arends, 81 111. App. 2d 391, 395, 225 N.E.2d 143, 146 (4th Dist. 1967).
88. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
89. 72 Ill. 2d at 149, 379 N.E.2d at 284 (1978).
90. Haugen v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 383, 550 P.2d 71, 74 (1976).
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will prepare him to cope with unknown, undiscoverable defects in prod-
ucts. 9 1 To deny protection in such instances would negate the purpose of
the strict liability doctrine of protecting innocent persons from injuries
caused by defective products. 92
Unfortunately, no reason is given in Grzelinski for not discussing the Fan-
cil test. This failure will place in question the applicability of the Fancil test
when lower courts are confronted with a fact situation similar to that found
in Grzelinski. An acknowledgement of the Fancil test by the Grzelinski court
could have led to a limiting of the test to the facts presented in Fancil.
Alternatively, the Grzelinski court could have recognized the Fancil
test as applicable under the facts before it, yet for reasons previously
indicated, could have reached the same result. The outcome of Grzelinski is
that a fireman, injured due to the defective condition of a product, has a
cause of action against the manufacturer and others in the chain of distribu-
tion subject only to the general rules controlling all product liability
claims.9 3 Yet to be determined is the assumption of risk question with re-
spect to duty in the context of a products liability claim.
CONCLUSION
The Grzelinski holding is far from a definitive statement regarding the
legal duty owed to a fireman or policeman injured while performing his
job. 94  Whether firemen and policemen constitute a special group requiring
specific limitations remains unsettled. By limiting its analysis to the narrow
question of the applicability of the fireman's rule, the court ignored the
broader, overriding issue of the availability of bystander protection to public
employees pleading strict liability causes of action. Public policy reasons jus-
tify protection to any bystander, regardless of the theory of recovery.9 5
The failure of the Illinois Supreme Court to establish a sound rationale
may cause confusion in future litigation. Just how much protection should be
given a public protector is a question yet to be determined by the Illinois
Supreme Court. Re-affirmation of the public policy reasons underlying by-
91. See Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 I11. 2d 552, 558, 328 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1975). See
also note 84 and accompanying text supra.
92. See note 2 supra.
93. 72 I11. 2d at 151, 379 N.E.2d at 285 (1978). The general rules controlling all strict
product liability claims under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) include the
following: (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product; and (b) it is ex-
pected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold. This rule applies even though: (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product; and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual relationship with the seller. See also McKean,
Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 3, 17 (1970).
94. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 51-74 and accompanying text supra.
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stander recovery in a strict liability action would have been beneficial both
to respond to the recent attacks upon these policy reasons and to dem-
onstrate that the result which the court reached was in accordance with
historical foundations of strict product liability actions. 96 The court's failure
to do so in Grzelinski may well pave the way for faulty approaches to the
resolution of public employee personal injury claims as attempts are made to
ascertain a proper basis for public employee protection.
Trudy McCarthy
96. Id.
